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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARILYN M. STONE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
li, 
vs. Case No. 17613 
I,: GORDON BARTH STONE, 
l, l: 
I,:: 
,: 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT MARILYN M. STONE 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant GORDON STONE's Order to Show Cause requesting 
a reduction in alimony was dismissed for failure to show a signif i-
cant change in circumstances, and GORDON STONE appealed. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Dean E. Conder, in the Third Judicial 
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, heard Appellant GORDON STONE's 
request to reduce alimony on January 6, 1981. In November, 1980, 
Appellant GORDON STONE moved the court for and was granted an 
Order to Show Cause why the alimony provision of the January 6, 
1976, Divorce Decree should not be modified to reduce alimony to 
$100.00 per month. Judge Conder considered the file, memoranda 
of counsel and the deposition of Appellant GORDON STONE in dis-
missjng the Order on January 19, 1981, on the basis that adjustments 
-1-
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in income, up or do n · f w , are insu ficient grounds to su pport an 
alimony modification. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant GORDON STONE seeks reversal of the trial 
court ruling dismissing his Order to Show Cause and an Order o: 
this Court modifying the Divorce Decree to reduce substantial!" 
l 
the amount of monthly alimony due Respondent MARILYN STONE. 
Respondent MARILYN STONE respectfully requests this 
Court to affirm the Judgment of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Rule 75 (p) (2) (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requ:: 
that the appellant's brief contain "a concise statement of the 
material facts of the case citing the pages of the Record 
supporting such statement." However, Appellant GORDON STONE do< 
not once cite the Record in his Statement of Facts. The State:i 
of Facts in Appellant GORDON STONE' s Brief is controverted by 
Respondent MARILYN STONE with references to the pages of the 
Transcript on Appeal and the Exhibits. 
Respondent MARILYN M. STONE and Appellant GORDON BAR~ 
STONE were married in February, 1953, and had six children duri: 
their marriage (R. 12-13) which ended by Divorce Decree dated 
January 6, 1976 (R. 15-18). At all times during the divorce, 
Rand Hirschi 
Respondent was represented by Jon C. Heaton and J. 
ward & Getc1r (R. 4, 12 & 15) of the law firm of Prince, Yeates, 
-2-
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of 
lly 
equ1: 
he 
: doc 
iurir 
ed 
e, 
and Appellant by Byron L. Stubbs (R. 8, 115, 160-161). Prior to 
~ntry of ':he Divorce Decree, the parties, with a iv ice of t~-.eir 
counsel (R. 115, 160-161) executed a stipulated property distri-
bution agreement (R. 5-10) which was incorporated into the 
Divorce Decree by the trial court (R. 15-18). 
Appellant has testified that he fully understood the 
agreement and consulted his attorney regarding the property 
distribution agreement prior to its execution (R. 160-161). 
Following the granting of the Divorce Decree, Appellant 
remarried and currently lives with his second wife and her two 
daughters by a former marriage (R. 166). Appellant's current 
wife works full-time (R. 161-162) and receives monthly child 
support payments for her minor daughter (R. 180) . 
Respondent is currently employed full-time as manager 
of the Boyles Brothers Employees Credit Union and has been so 
employed since the date of the Divorce Decree (R. 71). She 
currently has living at home one minor child and another child 
who recently returned from a full-time religious mission for the 
L.D.S. Church (R. 71). 
Based upon Appellant's tax returns, Exhibits 6-10 
herein, and pursuant to the terms of the Divorce Decree (R. 16-17), 
the currently monthly alimony due Respondent is at least $473.33. 
As a convenience to this Court, a summary of the calculations 
used in deriving this figure is attached as Exhibit "A" hereto. 
Further, monthly child support currently due under the Divorce 
Decree is $140. 00 (R. 16-17). 
-3-
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By letter of November 14, 1980 and without . 
' notice to 
opposing counsel, Appellant's counsel made d · 
emand upon ReJponde:· 
for reduction in alimony (R. 61-62), based 
upon the following 
reasons: 
1. Appellant realizes little net gain from salary 
increases after deduction of taxes and alimony increases (R. 
611 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Respondent's gross salary has increased (R. 61); 
Only one child remains living at home (R. 62); 
Respondent has failed to "adjust [her] life and 
improve [her] position" (R. 62); and 
5. Appellant's financial support of a son serving a 
full-time religious mission for the L.D.S. Church (R. 62). 
Appellant then moved the trial court for an Order to 
Show Cause why alimony should not be reduced to $100 per month, 
listing on the mailing certificate Denis R. Morrill, a partner t1 
the firm of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, and brother of Responde: 
as counsel (R. 20). Appellant's Motion was granted by Order of 
November 25, 1980 (R. 45). Pursuant to notice, Appellant wasd1· 
posed December 23, 1980 (R. 142-204) and Interrogatories were 
propounded by Respondent December 2, 1980 (R. 25-44). 
In his deposition, Appellant GORDON STONE set forth 
the basis for his request for reduction in alimony as follows: 
Question: What prompted you to make the request. 
for the change in the agreement at this 
time? 
Answer: 
l' that I aJ1I Living expenses and the fee ing I ork for 
not getting anything out of what w 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
le: 
11· 
or 
Question: Is there anything else that prompted you 
to make this request for the change in 
the agreement at this time? 
Answer: No. (R. 201-202) 
Appellant GORDON STONE further testified as follows respecting 
the changed circumstances experienced by Respondent MARILYN STONE: 
Question: Do you contend that your ex-wife, Marilyn 
Stone, has experienced changed circumstances 
which would justify the modification of the 
agreement? 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
Yes. 
What are those? 
Increases in her earnings. 
Do you know what those are? 
No. (R. 170) 
* * * * * * * 
Do you know whether or not she has attained 
a position [at her place of employment] of 
greater responsibility since 1976? 
No, she's been the manager there since then. 
And you have no idea what her income may 
or may not have been? 
No. 
At the time you entered into the agreement 
in 1976, you considered, didn't you, her 
income from Boyles Brothers? 
Yes. 
Do you contend there h~s bee~ any othe; 
changed circumstances ~n M~rilyn Ston7 ~ 
situation which would JUstify the modifica-
tion of the agreement? 
Yes. 
-5-
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Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
What is that other circumstance? 
Less children at home. (R. 171) 
* * * * * * * 
Is it your contention that you're seekin 
to have the court i;iodify both the child g 
support and the alimony obligations? 
No. 
What is your position? 
Just the alimony. 
Just the alimony? 
Yes. 
De:' you contend there are any other changec 
circumstances of Marilyn Stone which you 
believe would cause the court to modify tl; 
agreement? 
Not that I am aware of. 
Just so we are clear, you contend there 
are two changed circumstances of Marilyn 
Stone's situation which would justify the 
modification. One is the increase in her 
income, is that correct? 
Uh-huh (Affirmative). 
And the second is that there are fewer 
children in the home? (R. 172) 
(The witness is nodding affirmatively.) 
( R. 173 ) 
Appellant GORDON STONE also testified in his deposition thatn' 
has no knowledge of Respondent MARILYN STONE' s increased livir.; 
expenses (R. 173), medical expenses (R. 174) or extraordinary 
expenses (R. 174). 
In his deposition, Appellant GORDON STONE testified 
· two yea: that his employer furnishes him a new automobile every 
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and pays all maintenance, gasoline and related expenses (R. 152 _ 
154). This automobile is used by Appellant for non-business, 
~ersonal activities without compensation to the company (R. 154-
155). Appellant GORDON STONE also testified that he owns two 
homes (R. 175, 182-183). 
On January 6, 1981, a hearing on the Order to Show 
cause was held before the Honorable Dean E. Conder (R. 68). 
Both Appellant and Respondent were personally present with their 
respective counsel (R. 68). At the hearing, the court repeatedly 
attempted to elicit from Appellant's counsel the evidence upon 
which the request to reduce alimony was based. Appellant's counsel 
stipulated to the court that the only evidence to be offered was 
contained in Exhibits 1-10 admitted by the court (R. 122). 
Although present, Appellant did not testify. 
Following the hearing, Respondent filed with the court 
a Supplemental Memorandum in response to assertions made by 
Appellant's counsel at oral argument (R. 73-75). Also following 
the hearing, on January 14, 1981, Appellant served upon Respondent's 
counsel Appellant's Answers to Interrogatories (R. 76-105), 
Appellant's Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Reduction of 
Alimony (R. 106-111) and an affidavit of Appellant (R. 112-116). 
In his affidavit (R. 112-115), filed one week after 
the hearing at which he failed to testify, Appellant GORDON STONE 
made several self-serving statements respecting his income for 
the years 1975-1979 and respecting his claimed failure to follow 
his attorney's advice in executing the property settlement agreement. 
-7-
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Appellant's claim that Respondent MARILYN STONE's b th 
ro er, a 
partner in the law firm representing her throughout th is matter, 
had somehow coerced Appellant into ignoring his own 
attorney's 
counsel, was not brought out in Appellant's deposition nor at 
the January 6, 1981, hearing. In his deposition, Appellant 
specifically testified that he consulted with his current counst. 
prior to executing the agreement (R. 160-161). 
Judge Conder, by minute entry of January 19, 1981, 
dismissed Appellant's Order to Show Cause on grounds that there 
was not sufficient evidence to support a change in alimony (R.:. 
In so ruling, Judge Conder relied upon Carter v. Carter, 563 P.i 
177 (Utah 1977), in stating that "[a]djustrnents in income (upo: 
down) are not sufficient to base an adjustment in alimony." 
(R.117) In finding the evidence insufficient to support the 
requested change, Judge Conder relied upon the file, mernorandac 
counsel and the deposition of Appellant (R. 117), and signedt\: 
Order dismissing Appellant's Order to Show Cause on February JO, 
1981 (R. 132). Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on March 11 
1981 (R. 134). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT APPELLANT 
GORDON STONE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT 
MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY PAYMENTS. . 
The only question presented on appeal is whether 
Appellant GORDON STONE demonstrated substantial change in mater: 
support a reductiU: 
circumstances of the parties sufficient to 
a 
_Q_ 
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of alimony payments from approximately $473.33 per month to 
$100.00 per month. After hearing the evidence and considering 
arguments and memoranda of counsel, Judge Conder ruled that 
Appellant had failed to do so. 
On appeal, Appellant GORDON STONE asserts as bases 
for his attempts to reduce alimony, the following claimed changes 
in circumstances (Brief of Defendant-Appellant, p.2): 
1. Increase in Respondent Marilyn Stone's salary. 
2. Reduction in the number of minor children living 
at home. 
3. Increase in value of real property owned by 
Respondent. 
4. Obviation of Respondent's need for a large 
family home. 
5. Appellant's remarriage. 
6. Automatic increase in alimony as discouraging 
either party from improving their financial 
conditions. 
As Judge Conder ruled in the trial court, mere changes 
in income, up or down, are insufficient to support a modification 
of a Divorce Decree. Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1977). 
Appellant's reliance on the number of children in the 
home as a reason for reducing alimony is misplaced since the purpose 
of alimony is to "provide support for the wife as nearly as 
possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage, 
and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge." Georgedes 
v. Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44, 46 (Utah 1981). In this instance, 
where alimony and child support payments were bargained for by the 
parties, represented by counsel, as part of a stipulated property 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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distribution agreement incorporated in th D. 
e i vorce Decree, the 
sepa :ability of these support payments must be maintained. In 
this case, child support payments have been d 
re uced over time 
as the children have attained majority. 
Appellant can cite to nothing in the Record in suppor: 
of his assertions respecting the i·ncreased v 1 f a ue o Respondent': 
real property, Respondent's need for such a large family home,!: 
the counter-productive effect of the alimony escalation clause 
of the Divorce Decree. 
Appellant's remarriage is a voluntary disability whk 
does not relieve him of his obligations to his former family. 
Wright v. Wright, 586 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 1978). 
A. On Appeal, This Court Will Afford Considerable 
Deference to the Decision of the Trier of Fact. 
The modification ofa Divorce Decree is a matter of 
equity within the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court, 
Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981); Despain v. 
Despain, 610 P. 2d 1303, 1305 (Utah 1980); Land v. Land, 605 PJ' 
1248, 1250 (Utah 1980); Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotaud llli 
as amended; and, therefore, on appeal, this Court may review 
f 1 d t . f f t Chri"stensen v. Chr~ questions o aw an ques ions o ac . -
628 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Utah 1981); Izatt v. Izatt, 627 P.2d 49111 
(Utah 1981); Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, Section 9. In~ 
Se t forth the st~' sen v. Christensen, supra at 1299, this court 
yment 
for review of decisions denying modifications of support pa 
. d · derable [O l n review, this Court will accor . cons1 urt due 
deference to the judgment of the trial co 
-10-
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In the instant case, Judge Conder issued his ruling 
dismissing Appellant GORDON STONE's Order to Show Cause after 
hearing oral argument and considering the file, memoranda of 
counsel and the deposition of Appellant (R. 117). On appeal, 
Appellant asserts that the trial court accepted Appellant's 
figures respecting percentage increases in income experienced by 
the parties and that such figures were entered into evidence 
unopposed by Respondent MARILYN STONE. Appellant further asserts 
that "the balance of the evidence offered by the appellant-husband 
indicated that the respondent's needs and requirements had sub-
stantially decreased since the date of the original Divorce 
Decree." (Brief of Defendant-Appellant, p. 4). 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts above, Appellant 
GORDON STONE testified in his deposition that he had no personal 
knowledge of Respondent's needs and requirements. Appellant's 
inference that Judge Conder failed to consider all the evidence is 
rl simply not supported by the Record. 
;;, 
Even if Judge Conder had accepted the percentage increase 
E figures presented in Appellant's post-hearing memorandum, which 
1
: he did not (R. 117), no other evidence was offered by Appellant 
upon which the court could rely in making a determination respecting 
substantial change in material circumstances. Exhibits 1 through 
10, the tax returns for 1975 through 1979 of Respondent and 
-11-
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Appellant, were the only evidence offered at the hearing by 
Appellant. Although pi:esent at the January 6, 1981, hearing, 
Appellant GORDON STONE did not testify. Rather, he submittedm 
the court, some two weeks after the hearing, a personal affidavit 
containing numerous, self-serving statements designed to establi:' 
without threat of cross-examination, what he perceives to be 
significant changes in material circumstances. None of the 
assertions contained in the affidavit were raised in Appellant's 
deposition or at the hearing before Judge Conder. 
Judge Conder issued his ruling dismissing Appellant 
GORDON STONE's Order to Show Cause after the memorandum and 
affidavit of Appellant had been submitted. Appellant can point 
to nothing in the Record in support of his position that the 
trial court failed to consider the "balance of the evidence" 
which he alleges demonstrates that Respondent MARILYN STONE's 
needs and requirements have substantially decreased. Since Judge 
Conder' s decision is based upon all information before him at 
that time, and since Appellant has made no showing that (1) ~e 
evidence clearly preponderates contrary to Judge Conder's 
decision, (2) Judge Conder abused his discretion, or (3) Judge 
Conder misapplied principles of law, this Court should uphold the 
decision of the trial court. 
B. Alimony Payments Will Be Modified Only Upon 
A Showing of Substantial Change in Material 
Circumstances. 
While it is clear that the trial court has continuing 
jurisdiction to modify Divorce Decrees as demanded by equity, 
-12-
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fE_ulger v. Foulger, supra; Despain v. Despain, supra; Land v. 
~, supra; Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended, 
it is well settled that the moving party must show a substantial 
change of material circumstances to support such modification. 
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090, 1091 (Utah 1978); 
Sorenson v. Sorenson, 438 P.2d 180, 181, 20 Utah 2d 360 (1968). 
It is also well recognized by this Court that the party seeking the 
modification bears the burden of persuasion. Christensen v. 
Christensen, supra at 1299; Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, supra; 
Sorenson v. Sorenson, supra. 
In Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981), 
this Court stated: 
The change in circumstance required to justify a 
modification of the Decree of Divorce varies 
with the type of modification contemplated. 
Provisions in the original Decree of Divorce 
granting alimony, child support, and the like, 
must be readily susceptible to alteration at 
a later date, as the needs which such provisions 
were designed to fill are subject to rapid and 
unpredictable change. Where a disposition of 
real property is in question, however, courts 
should properly be more reluctant to grant a 
modification. In the interest of securing 
stability in titles, modifications in a Decree 
of Divorce making disposition of real property 
are to be granted only upon a showing of 
compelling reasons arising from a substantial 
and material change in circumstances. 
The above holds true a fortiori where the property 
disposition is the product of an agreement in 
stipulation between the parties and sanctioned by 
the trial court. such a provision is the product 
of an agreement bargained for by the partie~. As 
such, a trial court should subsequently modify such 
a provision only with great reluctance and based 
upon compelling reasons. 
-13-
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Although this Court has held that the standard of "great reluct;: 
and compelling reasons" applies to dispositions of .:eal property 
made pursuant to property settlement agreements between the 
parties, Foulger v. Foulger, supra; Despain v. Despain, 610 P.li 
1303, 1306 (Utah 1980); Land v. Land, supra at 1251, the Courth 
also shown greater deference to alimony and child support paymen: 
as integrated in property distribution agreements. Christensen·. 
Christensen, 628 P. 2d 1297 (Utah 1981); Despain v. Despain, 621 
P.2d 526 (Utah 1981). 
In Despain v. Despain, 627 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1981), 
this Court denied a defendant-husband's request for reduction 
of child support payments and stated: 
Defendant has not urged any compelling reasons 
for invoking the powers of equity to abrogate 
the property settlement; nor has he shown a 
change of circumstances to justify modification 
of the child support payments. Over a period of 
three years, the parties were involved in 
attaining an agreement. Both made concessions 
in exchange for benefits. 
* * * * * 
It is a proper assumption that plaintiff settled 
for the sum she received in reliance on the 
availability of additional funds to assist the 
children, living with her, in completing their 
education. It would be highly unequitable under 
the circumstances of this case to permit defendant 
to retain the benefits and be relieved of the 
obligations he assumed in his bargain with plaintiff· 
In the instant case, the sole change in circumstance 
addressed by Appellant GORDON STONE at the January 6, 1981, 
hearing was the increase in income experienced by both parties. 
(Exhibits 1 through 10.) The only other source of evidence to 
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which Appellant GORDON STONE can point in support of his allegations 
c·f ch<nged circumstance are his affidavits and deE-osition. As set 
forth above, Appellant testified in his deposition (R. 201) that 
the changed circumstances upon which he relied in seeking modifi-
cation of the alimony provision consisted of "living expenses and 
the feeling that [he is) not getting anything out of what [he) 
works for." (R. 201) He further testified that the only changes 
respecting the needs and circumstances of Respondent MARILYN STONE 
of which he was aware were an increase in her income and the fact 
that fewer children were living at home. (R. 172-173). Appellant 
also testified that he had no knowledge respecting changes in 
Respondent's cost-of-living expenses (R. 173), her medical expenses 
(R. 174), or other extraordinary expenses she may have encountered 
(R. 174) . 
The only changes in circumstances on the record are the 
increases in the respective salaries of Respondent and Appellant. 
It is clear from the lack of evidence on the Record that Appellant 
has failed to meet his burden of showing of a significant change 
in material circumstances, and the Order to Show Cause was properly 
dismissed. 
C. An Increase in a Former Wife's Income, Standing 
Alone, is Insufficient to Support a Modification 
of the Divorce Decree Reducing Alimony Payments. 
It is clear that the amount of alimony payable is not 
controlled solely by the income level of the husband. Carter v. 
Carter, 563 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1977); Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 
580 P.2d 1090, 1091 (Utah 1978). A change in income, however, is 
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an important factor for the court to consider in evaluating 
appropriate and equitable modification in alimony payments. 
Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981) ·, c arter v, 
Carter, supra; Callister v. Callister, 261 P.2d 944, 1 Utah2d: 
(1953). 
Other major factors to be considered by the court in 
considering alimony modifications are the needs and requirement 
the former wife and inflation, Carter v. Carter, supra; Wright 
Wright, 586 P. 2d 443, 445 (Utah 1978). The purpose for alimony 
is to "provide support for the wife as nearly as possible ~ 
the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage, and to 
prevent the wife from becoming a public charge." Georgedes v. 
Georgedes, supra. 
In his Brief, Appellant GORDON STONE attempts to 
distinguish Carter by assertion that the trial court had indepe~ 
knowledge going to the credibility of the husband. Even if~ 
could be distinguished on grounds of credibility, the rationale 
set forth in unaffected. Alimony payable is not dependent sote: 
upon changes, up or down, in income. 
D. The Record Contains No Other Evidence to Support 
Appellant's Contention of Significant Change 
In Circumstances. 
Appellant GORDON STONE in his Brief asserts that only 
one minor child is currently living with Respondent MARILYN STO~c 
Since the filing of this Appeal, another son has returned from 
for the L. D. s. Church and serving a full-time religious mission 
current:y resides with Respondent. 
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In support of his contention that the number of 
children livin<:J at home has something to do with Respondent's 
need for a large home, and that the value of the home is related 
to alimony payable, Appellant relies upon Sorenson v. Sorenson, 
438 P.2d 180, 20 Utah 2d 360 (1968). In Sorenson, this Court 
overturned the trial court's reduction in alimony on grounds that 
the defendant-husband had failed to show adequate basis for modi-
fica ti on. There, as here, the court noted that there was no 
evidence given or offered to show the amounts or values of property 
or income therefrom. Appellant's reliance on Sorenson is misplaced 
because the record before this Court does not contain anything 
to support the contentions relating to need for the home or change 
in value thereof. 
Appellant also cites, in his Index to Cases, Ridge v. 
Ridge, 542 P.2d 189 (Utah 1975). Ridge is not cited in the body 
of Appellant's Brief, but even it it were, the case is inapplicable 
since the reduction in alimony granted therein is based on a 
28 percent decrease in the husband's salary. In the instant case, 
Appellant's salary has increased substantially during the period 
since the Divorce Decree was granted. (Exhibits Nos. 6-10) 
The Record before this Court clearly does not support 
Appellant's contentions respecting changed needs and requirements 
of Respondent. 
E. Appellant's Remarriage Does Not Toll His. 
Obligation to Make Support Payments to His 
Former Wife and Children. 
Appell~nt GORDON STONE asserts, in his Brief (Brief of 
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Defendant-Appellant, p. 7) that his remarriage and voluntary 
support of his two step-children should somehow obviate his di:· 
to pay alimony and child support to Respondent. The voluntar; 
remarriage of the defendant-husband and assumption by him of 
support of his new wife and her children does not justify a 
reduction in alimony. Sorenson v. Sorenson, 4 38 P. 2d 180, Hl 
20 Utah 2d 360 (1968); See also Wright v. Wright, 586 P.2d rn,, 
(Utah 1978). 
F. The Alimony Increase Provision of the Divorce 
Decree is Valid According to Public Policy and: 
Enforceable. 
Paragraph 9 of the Divorce Decree provides, in part: 
[P]laintiff is awarded the sum of $200.00 
per month as alimony. This amount will continue 
as the alimony obligation until such time as 
defendant receives an additional salary increase. 
At the time of this additional increase, and at 
the time of any and all additional salary increases, 
defendant's alimony obligation shall increase by 
a sum equal to 35 percent of defendant's gross 
salary increase. (R. 17) 
In Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981), this 
Court overturned a lower court's alimony reduction and upheld 
a provision of a Divorce Decree granting the former wife chi!C 
support of $12,000 plus one-half of the former husband's after· 
tax income in excess of $24 ,000. In Christensen, the husband'! 
income had increased since the Decree, and he was reluctant to 
share the increase with his former family. This Court rejecte: 
his arguments respecting a decrease in profit margin and ~e 
failure of his former wife to become employed within a reasonat: 
time. 
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In the instant case, Appellant's contention that he is 
"not getting anything out of what [he] works for" (R. 201) is the 
same argument rejected in Christensen. Appellant in the case at 
bar was represented at the time of execution of the settlement 
agreement by the same attorney currently representing him. 
Appellant has admitted he consulted with counsel before signing 
the document (R. 160-161). This Court should not now reinstate 
rights and privileges Appellant has voluntarily contracted away 
simply because Appellant has come to regret the bargain made. 
Land v. Land, 604 P.2d 1248, 1251. (Utah 1980). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant GORDON STONE must meet the burden of showing a 
significant change in material circumstances to prevail on his 
request to decrease alimony. In light of the deference given trial 
court decisions on appeal, and in light of the dearth of evidence 
in the Record, this court should hold that Appellant has failed to 
meet his burden. Further, this Court should uphold the alimony 
increase provision of the Divorce Decree because Appellant knowingly 
entered the agreement with advice of counsel. To strike down the 
provision now that Appellant has come to regret his bargain would 
be unequi table to Respondent in high degree. 
This court should uphold the decision of the trial court. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Gordon Strachan, Esq. 
Steohen C. Rich, Esq. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. ' -rJI I hereby cert:i.fy that on the fl1 day of August, 
1981, I served two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent 
Marilyn M. Stone upon Byron L. Stubbs, Esq., attorney for 
defendant-appellant, by depositing said copies in the U.S. 
Mail, first-class postage prepaid thereon, addressed as 
follows: Byron L. Stubbs, Esq., 530 East 500 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84102. 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
35% of Total Monthly 
~ Salary Increase Increase Yearlx Alimony Paxments 
19 75 $15,200 $2,400 $ 200.00 
19 76 18,559 $3,359 $1,176 3,576 298.00 
19 77 19,858 1,299 455 4,031 336.00 
19 78 22,246 2,388 836 4,867 406.00 
19 79 24,568 2,322 813 5,680 473.33 
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